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Abstract
Caste rules prohibit the sharing of water between castes as a contact made by an untouchable with
water ritually taints the source. Despite untouchability practices being outlawed by the Constitution
of India, they are still vigorous and violently enforced. This is what is investigated in this article.
The aim is to evidence a relationship between the number of acts of violence against untouchables
and the way water is distributed. Our results show that, the more individual the source, the less
scope there is for potential ritual pollution and hence, the lower the number of violent acts against
untouchables. This is the first analysis, to the best of our knowledge, that quantifies and evidences
the enforcement of untouchability rules with regard to water distribution. This paper underlines that
water improvement programs have the nice side effect of alleviating caste based violence on top of
improving sanitation.
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Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising
out of "Untouchability" shall be an offence punishable in accordance with the law
Constitution of India; Fundamental Rights; Article 17
The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interest of the weaker sections of the
people and, in particular,of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social
injustice and all form of exploitation
Constitution of India; Directive Principles of State Policy; Article 46
1 Introduction
The Constitution of India that came into force in 1949, three years after independence outlawed caste
based discrimination and abolished untouchability that has been on for centuries in India. The caste sys-
tem forbids contacts with lower castes, and has resulted in practices referred to as untouchability, while
the so stigmatized low castes members are called untouchables that encompass both scheduled castes and
schedules tribes (hereafter "SCs" and "STs"). The Constitution, on which the Indian legal system rests,
has placed on the State the responsibility for improving the welfare of untouchables. For more than 60
years, Indian governments have spared no effort to design and implement policies dedicated to SCs and
STs, such as the controverted reservation of administrative positions, parliamentary and assembly seats
and access to universities, in accordance with the 46th article of the Directive Principles of State Policy
that enounces that "the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interest of
the weaker sections of the people and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes,
and shall protect them from social injustice and all form of exploitation". Policies directed at SCs and
STs have mainly focussed, besides reservations, on improving access to education and poverty allevia-
tion programs in the forms of grants and credit. Yet, these domains are not the sole where SCs and STs
are at a strong disadvantage because of their caste membership. They have been often denied access to
public infrastructure on the ground that they are untouchables. Although some efforts have been made
to improve SCs and STs access to common infrastructures such as roads, water sources or electricity,
evidence show that universal and equal access to public goods is far from being achieved (Anderson
(2007), Tiwary (2006)) and that efficient policies in this area have been too few. This situation does not
only arise from unequal wealth distribution across castes but also from caste based discrimination. For
instance, Ghanshyam et al. (2006) presents the results from a survey conducted in 2001-2002, in 565
villages of 11 states and show that, in nearly half of the surveyed villages, untouchables were denied
access to water facilities. In 28% of them they were denied entry into police stations and in 18% access to
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public roads or entry to primary health centers. Indeed, caste prescriptions prohibit the sharing of some
common resources, the most salient example being the sharing of water. The Constitution of India, rec-
ognized this issue as its 15th article of the Fundamental rights states that "no citizen shall, on grounds of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or
condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment;
or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly
out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public [...]".
The aim of this article is to put the emphasis on the role played by the mode of water distribution,
either collective or individualized on castes relationships and practices of untouchability. It is a well
known fact to anthropologists that willingness to accept water from another caste member is an indicator
of castes relationships1. In the Indian sociocultural context, water plays a specific role as a measure
of social distance as explained in a later section. As an example, Indian local newspapers abound with
stories of untouchables being beaten up for using higher caste wells. Our results, produced from a new
database on acts of violence against SCs and STs, show that (i) common water sources, such as tanks
and wells increase the proportion of crimes committed against the SCs and STs, (ii) while more individ-
ualized sources such as tubewells are effective at reducing the number of violent acts. All these results
are robust to the inclusion of many district and states controls. These analysis evidence that practices of
untouchability are still vigorous and that governments may be effective at alleviating if not the causes
at least the symptoms of social tensions by intensifying its public spending program in water access im-
provements. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first large scale attempt to quantify and evidence
the phenomenon.
This article is an extension of the literature about the effect of social fragmentation on the provision of
public goods and on conflicts. Previous works have found that high levels of social fragmentation do im-
pair public goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Banerjee and Somanathan, 2001; Banerjee et al., 2005;
Dayton-Johnson, 2000; Khwaja, 2009; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Bardhan, 2000) or induce conflict
(Collier, 2001; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2002, 2005). These studies implicitly rest upon upon the
idea that individuals feel a sense of community with members of their groups and perceive antagonisms
with outsiders. These two features are more clearly laid out in the design of the polarization measure
by Esteban and Ray (1994). The now popular polarization index includes a sense of group identification
that depends on the population frequency within the group and group alienation that can be considered
1For more details on this, please refer to "The Caste System in India" by M.N. Srinivas chapter 7 of Beteille (1974)
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as a measure of intergroup antagonisms. Many experiments in social psychology such as, among others,
the ones conducted by Tajfel et al. (1971); Chen and Li (2009) confirm these assumptions: individuals
exhibit strong in-group preferences and reluctance towards members of other groups, even when groups
are formed arbitrarily. These outcomes are strongly related to the process of social identification. Indi-
viduals easily class themselves and other into groups and identify with them.
Such an identification process may induce a wide array of economic outcomes as Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2010, 2005, 2000) have shown, ranging from heterogeneity of preferences (Chen and Li, 2009),
differences in prices (Ball et al., 2001), or conforming to detrimental stereotypes (Hoff and Pandey,
2006). One of the most obvious implication of social identity is the setting of social norms. However,
the social norms researchers mostly focus on govern within groups behaviors. Little stress has been put
on norms ruling interactions between groups. Still they have to exist. Even segregation is a norm.
Given that public goods give rise to groups interactions, it would seem fair to assume that there has to be
norms governing the use of public goods. Therefore social fragmentation does not only possibly impair
the provision of public goods, it may also mold the use that is made of these goods. The hypothesis on
which our analysis is built is that if norms govern the use of public goods, violations have to be punished.
This claim may help at understanding why the sharing of water sources is a ground for conflict in India.
Indeed the caste system provides many examples of the arguments above. Undoubtedly caste shapes
social identity. The ideology, tradition and texts that support the institution make a large way for rules
that should be observed within the caste but also in interacting with other castes. They clearly define with
whom one is to share his meal, water, street or to marry. Many of these bans include the sharing of com-
mon resources. For instance, each neighborhood is to be homogenous in terms of caste and has to have
its own water facility. This echoes the result obtained by Banerjee et al. (2005) that caste fragmentation
has a positive effect on the provision of water facilities. The rule governing some inter-caste relationships
is the absolute avoidance of contact and is referred to as untouchability as explained in the next section.
Our results show that these norms, as far as water sources are concerned, are still vigorous and that they
may be violently enforced. Indeed, it will be shown that shared water sources do significantly increase
the number of crimes against untouchables. Thereby, the results suggest that social fragmentation may
also impact the use of public goods and that the latter may sharpen social divide.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section (2) explains why water may be viewed as a source
of caste based conflicts. Section (3) show how this study falls in line with research on social identity and
its relationship with conflicts and the provision of public goods. Section (4) presents the data and section
(5) the empirical strategy, while results are commented in section (6). Section (7) concludes.
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2 Ritual Pollution Through Water
2.1 Castes And Ritual Pollution
The concept of ritual pollution governs relations between different castes. It is central to the institution.
As Srinivas (1974) puts it: "every type of inter-caste relation is governed by the concept of pollution.
Contact of any kind, touching, dining, sex and other relations between castes which are structurally
distant results in the higher of the two castes being polluted [...] Where contact does result result in
pollution, however, the polluted member of the higher caste has to undergo a purificatory rite in order
to be restored to normal ritual status. Such a purificatory rite is fairly simple where the structural dis-
tance between the castes is not very great and the type of contact is not serious. Sometimes, as when a
Brahmin eats food cooked by an Untouchable, the resultant pollution is so great that he or she has to be
excommunicated. Given untouchables very low status, structural distance between untouchables and the
rest of the population is probably one of the largest.
As stressed by Srinivas (1974), the degree of pollution does vary depending on the kind of contact. For
instance, entering a higher caste courtyard may be considered as an offense while touching an higher
caste glass or water results in one of the most extreme degrees of pollution. Food and water are the
paramount conveyors of ritual pollution. The geographical setting of traditional villages in India maps
the social structure and the ban on caste mingling. The heart of the village is the higher caste district,
while untouchables usually live in peripheral hamlets and rarely go through higher castes neighborhoods
Beteille (1965). As a consequence, publicly provided goods such as water sources are segregated, each
hamlet and thus caste groups having their own sources. Given the ritual pollution attached to untouch-
ables and the ban on physical contact with them, they are forbidden access to other castes water sources.
It is common knowledge in India that attempts from untouchables to draw water from higher caste wells
sparks rural violence. Nevertheless, this prohibition may take different shape depending on the water
source.
2.2 Individualized Versus Common Sources
Physical contact of an untouchable with water taints the source. Even the contact of a vessel belonging to
an untouchable does alter the ritual purity of the water (Dumont, 1970). Therefore, untouchables are not
allowed to access sources where their jars have to be immersed. Out of the four distribution types iden-
tified in our data (2001 Census of India), that are wells, tanks, tubewells and taps, this prohibition would
chiefly pertain to the first two. These two sources are therefore referred to as common. Of course, we are
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not able to rule out the possibility for tanks to have taps, in which case, little pollution would result from
an untouchable using it. Nevertheless, we envisage most tanks as open and water collected with vessels.
In villages where tubewells have been drilled, experience show that untouchables are not banned from
using them, given that such a use would not imply any direct physical contact of either the individual
or his vessel with water, but provided that untouchables stand last in lines. Therefore, this sort of water
access is considered in our study as individualized, although it is of common use. Tap distribution is
obviously considered as an individualized source. It may either be of common usage, in which case the
situation resembles that of tubewell or private, in which case it is the utmost individualized water source.
So far, the word individualized, in opposition to common has been used. We must reckon that the
choice of the words is not very fortunate. We tried to give a description of what is meant by individualized
and common in the precedent paragraph. We could have said that common sources are sensitive to
untouchables pollution, while individualized are less sensitive. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity and
conciseness, we carry on with the words common versus individualized, in the hope that what is meant
by these words is from now on more clear.
3 Data Description and Construction
3.1 Acts Of Violence
To the best of our knowledge, the database used in this article has not been analyzed before. Data on
crimes, both against SCs and STs as well as any crime that falls under the Indian Penal Code ("IPC"),
were collected from the National Crime Records Bureau ("NCRB") of the Indian Ministry of Home
Affairs at the district level for the year 2001. Data cover 31 states and union territories and spread across
581 districts2. The total number of crimes include murders, rape, kidnapping and abduction, dacoity,
robbery, arson, hurt as well as complaints under the 1955 Protection of Civil Rights Act and under the
1989 Prevention of Atrocities Act3. Acts of violence were collected irrespective of the perpetrators. The
national average number of crimes against untouchables is 16 per 100,000 individuals but exhibits strong
2Missing data are those of the following union territories: Lakshwadeep, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and
Puducherry
3The Protection of Civil Rights Act and the Prevention of Atrocities Act specifically target discriminatory and humiliating
practices, assaults, forced labour and crimes in relationship with untouchability. However, it seems that very few resort to this
legislation as it has not been very operative for several reasons ranging from low conviction rates, court partiality and the use
of SCs or STs as instruments by crime perpetrators. To be on the safe side, the total number of crimes perpetrated against SCs
and STs was retained as more representative
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variations across states as shown in the figure 1 below:
Figure 1: State-wise number of crimes against SCs and STs per 100,000 SCs and STs individuals
in 2001
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Source NCRB, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
Variations are even larger at the district level ranging from 0 to 199 in the Angul district of Orissa.
Although 2001 and 2002 saw an increase in the number of acts of violence committed against untouch-
ables , such an increase is not out of proportions as shown by figure 2. Indeed, the number of crimes lies
1.5 standard deviations away from the mean over the 1992-2007 period. Data at the district level were
only available for the year 2001 and lack of details for other years prevented us from using panel data.
Arguably, the variations in the number of acts of violence against SCs may come from regions or state
specificities such as proneness to violence irrespective of the crimes’ targets. The relationship between
the number of crimes against untouchables and the level of crimes in general, if it exists is only quite
weak. Correlation coefficient between the number of crimes against untouchables and against the rest of
the population is -0.0752 and significant only at the 10% threshold. In order to neutralize the potential
inertia of violence and to be on the safe side, the dependent variable used is the percentage of acts of
violence that specifically target SCs and STs over the total number of crimes as defined by the Indian
Penal Code. It is denoted hereafter crime. Please bear in mind that the number of charges accounted
for in the total number of crimes is larger than in the number of crimes against SCs and STs4. The
4Reconciliation of the numbers of complaints contingent on the targets and charges can not be performed due to a large
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Figure 2: Number of acts of violence against SCs 1992-2007 All India
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source NCRB, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
crime variable exhibits large variations at the district level ranging from 0 to 0.51. 99 out of the 581
observations are at zero. For positive values, the variable exhibits an average of 0.035 and a standard
deviation of 0.05. Total population as well as the percentage of SCs and STs will be introduced as control
variables.
Data on crimes against untouchables may underestimate the actual number of acts of violence for three
reasons: first, they only account for untouchables that file a complaint which is likely to be only a fraction
of the victims. Second, police forces are often thought as being on the side of higher castes. Third, as
the survey conducted by Ghanshyam et al. (2006) has shown, untouchables are sometimes denied entry
to police offices.
3.2 Access To Water And Other Public Goods
Main Variables
Data on the availability of different public goods come from the 2001 Census of India. The Census
gives details at the village and town levels about the presence of taps, tubewells, tanks and wells. Based
on this information we have calculated the percentage of the district population that has access to water
"other" category in the composition of the number of crimes against untouchables and due to the presence of a specific legisla-
tion related to untouchability.
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through taps, tubewells, wells and tanks for 573 districts. Whenever one source was present in a vil-
lage, the village population was accounted for as having access to water through such a source. In some
instances, two or more sources were mentioned. In this case, village population was ascribed to each
source. For instance, if a village of, say 5,000 inhabitants, had water distributed through tap and well
and tank, the number of people for that village that have access to tap is 5,000, and the same number is
reported for tanks and wells. The numbers are then aggregated at the district level and then divided by
the total district’s population. Therefore the percentages of inhabitant that access water through tap, tank,
well or tubewell do not sum up to 1. The reason for such a method is to avoid ranking the types of water
distribution modes. Indeed, had we taken the best of the three modes, we would have made a judgement
call that may not be relevant and increased the correlations among the water distribution modes.
A note of caution is necessary. The Census does not provide information on whether these sources are
private or public. For instance, tanks may be of common usage or privately maintained. Given that the
Census mainly focuses on public goods, sources have been supposed to be of common usage. Such an
assumption might introduce a downward bias in our results since the influence of truly public sources
might be spread across both private and public sources.
Despite governments endeavors to improve water access, especially since it has been set as a core target
of poverty alleviation programs, heterogeneity remains. Large disparities exist across states as well as
between urban and rural regions. For instance, in 2001, only 23% of the households had access to water
through either taps or tubewell in Kerala, while this number was 98% in Punjab.
On average 56% of a population’s district access water through tap (standard deviation 0.31), 20%
through tanks (standard deviation 0.19), 40% through tubewell (standard deviation 0.29) and 52% through
wells (standard deviations 0.31). Although large disparities are found between districts, heterogeneity
within states is relatively low as shown by figure 3 displayed on next page. Standard deviations asso-
ciated with the four water variables are rather low at the state level especially compared to the overall
sample.
As already mentioned, for our results to hold, we need to rule out states’ specificities such as cultural
violence or tensed caste relationships. In order to do so, we will resort to state fixed effects. The trouble
is that the lack of heterogeneity of the water sources variables within states may weaken the water source
effect. If the water source variables were introduced as such in a fixed effect regression, we request a
small variations in the percentage of people who have access to the various sources to have an effect on a
comparatively large variation in the dependent variable, i.e. the number of crimes. Besides, the potential
multi-collinearity arising from the four water source variables may also be an issue.
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Principal Component Analysis
To tackle both the issues of low within states heterogeneity in the water source variables and of
potential multi-collinearity, a principal component analysis ("PCA") of the water sources variables is
performed. Moreover, reducing the four variables to a single indicator (named "water") measuring the
degree of individualization of the source will prove useful. Because PCA maximizes the variance of the
original variable space, such a procedure is expected to reintroduce heterogeneity within the variables.
The first component derived from the PCA has an Eigenvalue of 1.66 and accounts for 41% of the
variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy takes on values between 0 and 1
and assesses whether the overall variables have too little in common to warrant a PCA. Cutoff point is
0.49. Lower values would indicate that PCA is not appropriate. This test, in our example is 0.54 which,
although low, passes. We chose to retain the first component although the second component Eigenvalue
is 1.06 and explains 26% of the variance (the rule of thumb being to retain Eigenvalues whose values are
greater than 1). The decision to retain only the first component rests on the scoring coefficients, whose
ordering makes more sense in our example. Figure below 4 presents the scoring coefficients for the two
components:
Figure 4: Scoring coefficients for the two components
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The ordering of the variables according to the first component is in adequacy with the concept of
common versus individualized sources. The scoring coefficient decreases with the individualization of
the source. They are presented in table 1 below.
Table 1: Scoring coefficients
Component 1 Component 2
Tap -0.5945 0.2564
Tubewell -0.1789 0.836
Tank 0.4496 0.4624
Well 0.6422 0.1465
Given the scoring coefficients, the first component may be thought of as an inverse index of source
individualization. The ordering of the sources according to the second component makes the interpreta-
tion more difficult. As a consequence only the first component is retained. The variables, tap, tubewell,
tank and well are then standardized and scoring coefficients are applied according to create the variable
water according to the following formula:
water = −0.5945× tap standardized
−0.1789× tubewell standardized
+0.4496× tank standardized
+0.6422× well standardized
As mentioned, given the weights attributed to the variables, the water variable may be thought of
as an index of the collectiveness of the variable. The minimum attained by the water variable is -2.74
and occurs when 100% of the population access water through tap and tubewell. Maximum is 3.4 and
occurs when 96% of the population access water through wells, 77% through tanks and 5% through taps
and tubewells. The variables approximates 0 when access is equally spread between taps, tubewells and
tanks, wells.
Other Public Goods
In order to clearly mark the specific role of water access on crimes against untouchables, other
measures of access to public goods will be included as control variables such as the percentage of the
district population that live in villages that are electrified or connected by paved roads as well as the
number of schools per district inhabitant. On average, 88% of the district population live in electrified
areas (standard deviation 0.18), 75% in villages or towns connected by road (standard deviation 0.20).
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On average a district has 9 primary and 3 middle schools per 100 inhabitants (standard deviation are 0.06
and 0.02 respectively).
3.3 Polarization
In order to control for potential antagonisms between castes, a polarization index has been calculated
following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) as:
P =
N∑
i
pi1+αi pij
where pii is the population’s share of the ith group or caste among N . α is a parameter that may be
considered as polarization’s sensitivity. It measures the sensitivity of the index to a shift from a low
polarized society to highly polarized one. For α = 0, the polarization index comes down to the standard
factionalization index that measures the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to the
same group. The fractionalization index increases with the number of groups and is maximized at the
uniform population distribution over these groups. Yet, this situation is not the one where the greatest
level of antagonisms will be found. A situation where two large groups face each other is rather more
conducive to potential conflicts. Polarization indices account for a such a situation and departs from
the standard fractionalisation index by increasing the weights on population frequencies through the
parameter α. α is to lie in the [0;1.6] interval to ensure polarization is maximized when population
is concentrated on two equally sized groups. The larger α, the larger the increase in the polarization
measure when shifting from a low polarized society to a highly polarized one.
Caste polarization index has been calculated with i={SCs, STs, Others}. We must admit this is quite
a rough measure as Indian society is much more fragmented along the lines of caste than merely split
into three groups. Besides, intergroup social distance between SCs and STs may be smaller than between
SCs and the rest of the population. However, this indicator has the virtue of accounting for the relative
size of each group and to capture a potential non linear relationship between crimes against SCs and STs
and their relative weights within the population. Summary statistics for the polarization measures are
given in the table below:
A similar index of religious polarization is included to account for the fact that caste based antago-
nisms may vary depending on the relative size of the different religious denominations, although castes
transcend religions. The index of religious polarization has been calculated for α = 0 and α = 1.6.
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Table 2: Polarization summary statistics
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Polarization α = 0 0.356 0.13 0.018 0.632
Polarization α = 1.6 0.118 0.028 0.009 0.163
4 Estimation Strategy
4.1 Base Specification
Given that observations are left censored at 0 and that 17% of the observations are at 0, a Tobit model
has been used with left censoring.
Let y∗i be the latent variable associated with crimei, where crimei is the number of crimes targeting SCs
and STs over the total number of crimes in district i, so that
crimei =
 0 if y∗i ≤ 0y∗i if y∗i > 0
y∗i is assumed to have a normal, homoskedastic distribution with zero conditional mean. Let’s note Xik
the vector of explanatory variables, i standing for the district and k serves at identifying the explanatory
variable. The intercept has been absorbed intoXik for notational simplicity. The following equation may
be written
y∗i = βkXik + εi
εi/Xik ∼ N(0, σ2)
(1)
Since ε/σ is assumed to be normally distributed and independent from Xk it could be written:
P (crimei = 0|Xik) = 1− Φ(Xikβk
σ
) (2)
where Φ is the standard normal density function.
Let’s note
di =
 0 if crimei = 01 if crimei > 0
Hence the likelihood function for each observation i out of a total of N :
L =
N∏
i=1
[
1
σ
φ
(crimei −Xikβk)
σ
]di [1− Φ(Xikβk
σ
)](1−di) (3)
14
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.74
where φ is the standard normal cumulative function. The log-likelihood function for each observation i
ln(L) = `i(β, σ) =
N∑
i=1
{di(−lnσ + lnφ(crimei −Xikβk
σ
)) + (1− di)ln(1− Φ(Xikβk
σ
))}
The vector of explanatory variablesXik encompasses, in addition to the intercept the following variables
for district i:
Wateri is the component obtained from the PCA as described in section 3.2
ln(population)i is the log of the district’s population
rurali is the percentage of the districts’ population that is rural
literacyi is the literacy rate
castecompositioni is a measure of the social composition by caste. In a first step, this measure
will be the percentage SC and ST in the population together with their
quadratic form.
In a second step, it will be represented by polarization indices for α = 0
(i.e. fractionalization) and α = 1.6 (i.e. the highest possible polarization)
religiouscompositioni is the religious polarization index for α = 0 and α = 1.6
Equation 1 may then be written in full as
y∗i =β0 + β1wateri + β2ln(population)i + β3rurali + β4literacyi
+ β5castecompositioni + β6religiouscompositioni + εi
εi ∼ N(0, σ2)
(4)
Naturally, water is the variable of interest and the lower the index, the more districts inhabitants
access water from individualized sources. The higher the index, the more common is the access to water.
β1 is therefore anticipated positive given our main assumption: the more common the water source the
higher the number of acts of violence against untouchables.
Other control variables come from the 2001 Census of India. As far as the role of caste composition
is concerned, we expect an inverse U shape relationship between the percentage of untouchables and
the crime variable in the spirit of polarization. Indeed, literature on polarization Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2002), Esteban and Ray (1994) show that the highest probability of conflicts occurs when two
equally sized group face each other. With respect to the caste polarization measure, a positive relationship
is expected for a high α while fractionalization is anticipated to be hardly relevant. Indeed, as already
discussed, fractionalization is maximized by an equal distribution of the population on a large number
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of groups, a situation which may not necessarily lead to violence 5. The role of religious composition is
far from obvious. Although caste mainly stems from Hinduism, the institution does transcend religions
and is found among Muslims, Christians and, although in a much attenuated way, even in religions that
originally rejected the system such as Sikhism or Jainism. Therefore the expected sign is not clear. Nev-
ertheless, religious violence is unfortunately not a rare phenomenon in India and may be exacerbated in
a polarized context. Religious violence may replace caste based violence in highly religiously polarized
environments. This hypothesis would lead us to anticipate a negative effect of religious polarization on
caste based violence.
4.2 Potential Endogeneity Issues
4.2.1 Omitted Variables
It is a well known fact that some states in India, such as Rajasthan, Bihar or Uttar Pradesh for instance,
are more prone to caste based violence than others. A variety of reason may be invoked such as economic
backwardness, local traditions or political representations. Indeed, some parties such as the Bharatiya
Janata Party ("BJP") have a reputation for inspiring caste based violence, if not religious confrontations.
The Ranvir Sena private militia largely run by upper castes landlords in areas of the state of Bihar is
known for its exactions against untouchables. The role of traditions is particularly strong in Rajasthan.
All these reasons are potentially correlated with public goods provision such as water distribution. This
raises the issue of omitted variables. As far as economic backwardness is concerned, the states 2001
GDPs are introduced as control variables. We had to resort to state indicators, since district level GDPs
are notoriously unreliable or nowhere to be found. We also introduce a human development index as of
1991, which more broadly accounts for economic development at the state’s level. Unfortunately, we
were not able to control for political representation at the states parliaments. To be on the safe side, state
fixed effects are introduced, which, arguably, would capture all the states specificities.
4.2.2 Reverse Causality
The provision of safe water has been given priority in the Constitution of India, with article 47 conferring
the duty of providing clean drinking water. What the Census refers to as safe drinking water is water
distributed through either taps or tubewells/handpumps. Many programs have been designed and imple-
mented to improve water access. We would be faced with reverse causality if these programs were to
5for an excellent review of why fractionalization is irrelevant to the analysis of conflict, please refer to Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005)
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take into account the untouchables situation in one way or another. Either programs specifically target
regions where untouchables are particularly at a disadvantage or they neglect zones where most caste
based conflicts are found. Given that water improvement programs are often part of poverty alleviation
programs, the first scenario is the most likely. The 2001 National Human Development Report published
by the Indian Planning Commission specifically addresses access by SCs and STs to safe drinking wa-
ter and compare them to the rest of the population, thereby showing government’s concerns for these
groups. If water improvement programs are to take into account SCs and STs situations, this would be in
the sense of favoring them rather than avoiding regions where they are the most at a disadvantage. Thus,
if a reverse causality exists it is most likely to be unfavorable to our results and induce a downward bias.
It could be argued that the Indian government policies and programs have put an increasing emphasis
on community participation and that such an emphasis may prompt reverse causality. Steps were initi-
ated in 1999 to institutionalize community participation in the implementation of rural drinking water
supply schemes6. Institutional mechanisms have been put in place at the national, state, district, block
and panchayat levels to monitor water access improvement programs. It could be thought that highly vi-
olent environments are less likely to show the local cooperation necessary to implement such programs.
In this case, the reverse causality would favor our results and introduce an upward bias. We have two
main reasons to believe that this is not the case. First, the communities empowerment programs only
started a year before data were collected. This probably is not sufficient to change the patterns of water
distribution modes to an extent that would greatly affect our results. Second, communities are not the
sole actors. Authorities at the district and state levels also have a word to say and as mentioned earlier, it
is unlikely that this word will be in disfavor of violent areas.
5 Results
5.1 Base Specification
We wish to examine whether water access does impact the number of crimes against untouchables. Table
3 presents the results. As expected the index of water commonality is positive and significant. Shared
water sources are significantly associated with a larger proportion of violent acts against untouchables.
This effect holds for the various specifications presented. In specification (1) only the percentages of SCs
and STs in the district population are entered together with an index of religious fractionalization.
6source: Water aid (NGO) report published by the National Urban Water Awards sponsored by the Government of India
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Table 3: Water Access Effect on the Percentage of Crimes
Percentage of Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Water 0.00745*** 0.00713*** 0.00742*** 0.00567*** 0.00605***
(0.000381) (0.000699) (0.000428) (0.00588) (0.00329)
ln(population) -0.00195 -0.000712 -0.000920 0.00154 0.000761
(0.530) (0.819) (0.770) (0.534) (0.762)
% dist. pop. rural -0.0212 -0.0220 -0.0165 -0.0120 -0.0163
(0.177) (0.161) (0.289) (0.446) (0.304)
literacy rate -0.0584*** -0.0630*** -0.0610*** -0.0680*** -0.0624***
(0.00674) (0.00362) (0.00458) (0.00189) (0.00440)
% dist. pop SC 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.445***
(3.27e-05) (1.04e-05) (1.96e-05)
% dist. pop SC2 -0.858***
(0.00173)
% dist. pop ST 0.0212 0.0209 -0.0735**
(0.127) (0.133) (0.0209)
% dist. pop ST2 0.144***
(0.000110)
Religious polarization α = 0 -0.0523***
(0.000326)
Religious polarization α = 1.6 -0.224*** -0.194*** -0.258*** -0.252***
(6.69e-05) (0.000638) (5.95e-06) (8.50e-06)
Caste polarization α = 0 0.00290
(0.873)
Caste polarization α = 1.6 0.175**
(0.0374)
Observations 573 573 573 573 573
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
While the percentage of SCs significantly increases the likelihood of caste based violence, the per-
centage of STs is not significant. This may be due to a potential non linear relationship between the
percentage of untouchables and the number of acts of violence as the literature about conflicts and polar-
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ization suggests. Indeed, when the quadratic term for the percentage of STs is introduced in specification
(3), a U-shaped relationship is found. STs tend to predominantly live in North Western States such as
Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh or in the Andaman and Nico-
bar Islands. Tribes represent 52% of the population in these states against 8% for all India. When these
states are removed from the sample, both the simple and quadratic form of the percentage of STs lose
their significance 7. Indeed, in states were they are not so numerous, tribes tend to live in isolated villages
and do not mingle much with the rest of the population. This would explain why, when tribal states are
removed from the sample, the percentage of STs is found to be irrelevant.
On the other hand, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the percentage of SCs and the
number of acts of violence against them. SCs are more spread across the country. They represent on av-
erage 15% of the district’s population ranging from 0 to 50%, although they account for more than 40%
in only 29 of the 581 districts sampled. This inverted U-shaped relationship confirms the results found in
the literature that studies the impact of polarization on conflict. The highest probability of conflict occurs
when two equally sized groups face each other. Thus a caste polarization index is introduced in lieu of
the percentages of SCs and STs in specifications (4) and (5). Not surprisingly the polarization index for
α = 0 (i.e. the fractionalization index) is not found significant while it is and positive for α = 1.6, which
makes sense given that polarization indices are best suited than the fractionalization index to capture
potential antagonisms. The religious polarization index was introduced for the two values of α (specifi-
cation (1) versus (2) and next) and both the religious fractionalization and polarization indices are found
significant. Given the previous discussion about the impact of polarization versus that of fractionaliza-
tion, we chose to retain the religious polarization index for α = 1.6 in subsequent estimations. The
negative sign associated with the religious polarization index is difficult to interpret. One explanation
could be brought forward, although it is a mere assumption. In religiously polarized contexts, religion
based conflicts may overtake caste based conflicts and thus would reduce the number of acts of violence
against untouchables. Nevertheless, the positive impact of the water index is robust to the introduction
of the polarization indices, meaning that even when the various potentially confrontational contexts are
accounted for, water communality remains associated with caste based violence.
Please recall that the water commonality index, which is the variable of interest was obtained through
a PCA in order both to reintroduce heterogeneity in the data and to reduce potential multi-collinearity.
Yet, in order to dispel doubts about the genuineness of the procedure, estimations with the four variables
included in the PCA are presented in table 7 in appendix. Results show that access through tanks and
7 Results from this estimation are presented in table 8 in appendix
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wells significantly increase the number of acts of violence against untouchables, while access through
tubewells significantly decrease this number. Tap access however is not significant. The table shows that
increasing by 1 unit the percentage of people that can access water by tubewell may reduce by 3% the
percentage of acts of violence targeting SCs and STs.
5.2 State Specificities
As already mentioned other factors may influence the level of public goods supply such as economic
or human development, politics or tradition. Since these factors may be correlated with caste based
violence, we need to control for these possibilities. Table 4 below presents the results when the state
GDP is entered (specification (1), (3) and (4)), when the Human Development Index (hereafter "HDI")
is included (specification (2), (3) and (4)) and state fixed effects (specification (5)). Again, the water
commonality index is positive and significant across all specifications. Both the log of the state’s GDP
and the HDI are significant, although this mainly stems from the state of Uttar Pradesh, that is one
of the wealthiest and most populated state, but also one where caste relationships are tensed to put it
mildly. When Uttar Pradesh ("UP") is removed from the sample (specification (4)), both GDP and HDI
lose significance. The particularity of this state supports the necessity to account for state specificities.
This is what specification (5) does by introducing states fixed effects in the equation. Interestingly, caste
polarization loses its significance when states variables are introduced. This probably stems from the fact
that the index does not sufficiently vary within states. Indeed within states average standard deviation of
the index is 0.019 compared to an average of 0.12. Even when state specificities are taken into account,
the more common the water source, the higher the number of acts of violence against untouchables.
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Table 4: Water Access Effect - State Controls and Fixed Effects
Percentage of Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Water 0.00626*** 0.00809*** 0.00805*** 0.00874*** 0.00590**
(0.00228) (0.000591) (0.000613) (0.000347) (0.0486)
ln(population) -0.00984** -0.000988 -0.0116*** -0.00733* -0.00328
(0.0103) (0.710) (0.00498) (0.0917) (0.390)
% dist. pop. rural -0.0198 -0.0274 -0.0293* -0.0356** -0.000232
(0.211) (0.104) (0.0821) (0.0408) (0.990)
literacy rate -0.0649*** -0.0369 -0.0401 -0.0241 -0.0237
(0.00293) (0.207) (0.169) (0.431) (0.382)
Religious polarization α = 1.6 -0.250*** -0.206*** -0.203*** -0.312*** -0.0892
(9.05e-06) (0.000924) (0.00106) (2.52e-06) (0.166)
Caste polarization α = 1.6 0.113 0.172* 0.0976 0.163* 0.124
(0.187) (0.0585) (0.295) (0.0929) (0.204)
ln (state GDP) 0.0104*** 0.0105*** 0.00311
(0.000589) (0.00151) (0.377)
Human Development Index -0.0895** -0.0864* -0.000626
(0.0489) (0.0567) (0.990)
Observations 571 527 525 455 573
Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
Sample All All All UP removed All
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
5.3 Other Public Investments
There are three reasons to introduce public investments in other types of infrastructure in the equation.
First, it will underline the unique position enjoyed by water supply. As exposed earlier, public invest-
ments in water supply plays a specific role in crimes against untouchables, due to the Indian sociocultural
context. Second, although we have done our best to control for all the usual variables that influence pub-
lic goods provision such as polarization, wealth or state specificities, introducing other types of public
goods may help at controlling for potentially omitted factors. Third, other public investments such as
education for instance may be thought of having an incidence on crimes against untouchables. Table 5
below presents the results when other kinds of public investments are introduced without and with state
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fixed effects (specifications (1) to (4) and (5) to (8) respectively).
Table 5: Water Access Effect - Including other Infrastructures
Percentage of Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Water 0.00738*** 0.00685*** 0.00482** 0.00598***
(0.000776) (0.00138) (0.0275) (0.00572)
% villages electrified 0.0299*
(0.0837)
% villages connect. by road 0.0210 -0.00597 0.0115
(0.169) (0.723) (0.463)
Nbr primary school / inhab. -0.239***
(0.000442)
Nbr middle school / inhab. -0.356**
(0.0214)
Observations 573 573 573 573
Fixed Effects No No No No
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Water 0.00548* 0.00530* 0.00527* 0.00499*
(0.0675) (0.0765) (0.0773) (0.0955)
% villages electrified -0.0360
(0.112)
% villages connect. by road -0.0458** -0.0621*** -0.0502**
(0.0304) (0.00497) (0.0185)
Nbr primary school / inhab. -0.178**
(0.0153)
Nbr middle school / inhab. -0.342
(0.108)
Observations 573 573 573 573
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
All specifications include ln(population), % rural, literacy, caste and religious polarizations
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The 1st and 5th specifications introduce the percentage of villages that are electrified in a district.
This does not change the sign of coefficients associated with the variable of interest although it becomes
significant only at the 10% level when state fixed effects are introduced. The coefficient for electricity is
barely significant without fixed effects and loses its significance with fixed effects.
When the percentage of villages accessible by road is introduced, coefficients associated with the water
variable remain significant, although only at the 10% threshold with fixed effects. The road variable is
significant and negative once states fixed effects are introduced. Presumably, what this variable captures
is the district’s level of isolation and backwardness. Therefore, even controlling for this aspect of the
district, results concerning water still hold. Please note that the diminished coefficient may stem from
a significant correlation of -0.43 between the water index and the percentage of villages accessible by
road.
As mentioned, education could be thought of having a negative impact on caste based violence. Pre-
sumptive evidence is found with the negative and significant coefficient associated with the population’s
literacy rate in previous tables. Indeed, the numbers of primary and middle schools per inhabitant have a
negative significant effect on caste based violence, although the effect looses its significance for middle
school once fixed effects are introduced. This may be due to the fact that middle schools are less local.
They recruit within a larger radius, which dampens the variable’s variance within states. Nevertheless, a
reassuring result is that infrastructure in primary education are also effective at reducing violence against
SCs and STs. Yet, the results associated with the index of water communality are robust to all these in-
clusions, thereby stressing the fact that water distribution plays a role of its own, even when other public
investments are also effective at reducing the number of acts of violence against SCs and STs and when
state specificities are accounted for.
We have seen that the number of crimes against untouchables is affected by the water distribution
mode. This result is robust to various specifications including state specificities and other public invest-
ments. Therefore, a nice unexpected side effect of water improvement programs is the reduction in the
number of possible bones of contention between castes. A note of caution is necessary. We do not claim
that generalizing access to tap water will eradicate caste based violence. This would be presumptuous
and absurd. What is claimed is that the government’s efforts to provide safe drinking water (i.e. through
taps or tubewells) with the intent of improving public health, have the nice side effect of weakening the
role of excuse played by water for caste based violence. No doubt that caste confrontations will occur
on other grounds. Yet given the salience of water in caste prohibitions, eliminating such a bone of con-
tention is of great interest. This recommendation may appear shortsighted and pointless if the institution
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of caste is not fought at its base. We fully concur on this view, yet these water improvement programs
would provide some temporary relief to oppressed caste besides improving public sanitation. What our
results stress is a side effect of public investments rather than its essential purpose.
5.4 Violence Inertia
The question we now wish to address is: "does the effect of water supply vary according to different lev-
els of violence?". It may very well be the case that the same source of social tensions, water for instance,
has a larger impact in an already violent environment. In order to provide some elements, a simultaneous
quantile regression has been carried out. This methodology considers the error correlation between dif-
ferent quantiles thanks to the bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix. It enables comparison between
coefficients in different quantiles (Koenker and Hallock (2001)). The percentage of crimes is split into
four quantiles. Results are presented in table 6.
Table 6: Quantiles Regressions
Percentage of crimes
(1) (2) (3)
q25 q50 q75
Water 0.00110 0.00378*** 0.00671***
(0.146) (0.000555) (7.55e-05)
ln (population) 0.00135*** 0.00117 -0.000428
(0.00157) (0.223) (0.818)
% dist. pop rural -0.00287 -0.00579 -0.00781
(0.301) (0.178) (0.406)
literacy rate -0.0153** -0.0479*** -0.109***
(0.0192) (2.97e-05) (3.45e-10)
Religious polarization α = 1.6 -0.0733*** -0.0918*** -0.112**
(3.09e-06) (0.000809) (0.0363)
Caste polarization α = 1.6 0.0558*** 0.110*** 0.169**
(0.00211) (0.00257) (0.0269)
Observations 573 573 573
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
24
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.74
These results clearly evidence that water is only an excuse for caste based confrontations. Indeed,
where violence is low, the water distribution mode has no impact. Yet, in already violent environments,
the impact of water increases together with the level of violence. Conclusions that may be drawn from
this analysis are twofold. First, water really is an excuse for already existing caste based violence and
as mentioned earlier, investments in public infrastructure would not eradicate the problem, but rather
provide some temporary relief. Second, if a choice has to be made about which zones should be given
priority in terms of water access improvements, such a decision would benefit from taking caste based
violence as one of the criteria.
6 Conclusions
It has been demonstrated in this paper that violence targeting untouchables is significantly linked to the
water distribution mode. These results induce many consequences. First, they show that untouchability
practices are still common in India. In compliance with caste prescriptions, untouchables are denied
access to common water sources and in accordance with stories of caste based violence recounted in
newspapers, this prohibition is violently enforced. One could think that this study is India specific. Yet,
this Indian example encourages us to question the role of social norms on public goods usage. So far, the
literature has attempted to show the negative impact of social fragmentation on the provision of public
goods, through diminished collective action. Yet, the collective action problem may arguably be solved
by the creation of intergroup norms, such as the exclusion of a group in our case. In this event, there
is not much ground to think that social fragmentation impacts public goods provision. Rather, publicly
provided goods and their attached social norms may sharpen social antagonisms and divides.
Another point evoked by the study is the need for policy makers to look into the usage that is made
of public goods. Most development programs focus on the level of public goods and do not attach the
necessary importance to what use is made of the goods.
Lastly, improving water access does reduce the number of crimes against untouchables. Although water
improvement programs are mainly designed out of public health concerns, recognizing that it has a
side effect on caste based violence adds an argument for increased efforts in this domain. As already
mentioned, it is not claimed that water improvement programs will uproot caste violence and there is
little doubt that confrontations between caste will occur on other grounds. Excuses for caste based
violence do not lack. Yet, given the salience of water in caste traditions, improving water access may
provide temporary relief to oppressed groups on top of improving sanitation.
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Appendix
Table 7: Type of Water Access Effect on the Percentage of Crime - individual water access modes
Percentage of Crime Marginal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Effect
% dist. pop water access through tanks 0.0231* 0.0198 0.0223* 0.0292** 0.0316** 0.019
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0134)
% dist. pop water access through wells 0.0175* 0.0164* 0.0173* 0.0107 0.0252** 0.017
(0.00921) (0.00921) (0.00916) (0.00951) (0.00987)
% dist. pop water access through tubewells -0.0319*** -0.0299*** -0.0315*** -0.0339*** -0.0347*** -0.026
(0.00914) (0.00915) (0.00901) (0.00915) (0.00950)
% dist. pop water access through tap 0.00378 0.00332 0.00493 -0.000719 0.00805 -
(0.00911) (0.00916) (0.00915) (0.00917) (0.0103)
ln district population 0.00301 0.00372 0.00232 -0.00765** 0.000662 -
(0.00272) (0.00271) (0.00270) (0.00385) (0.00287)
% district pop rural -0.0237 -0.0185 -0.0199 -0.0255 -0.0371** -
(0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0171)
literacy rate -0.0672*** -0.0712*** -0.0698*** -0.0670*** -0.0395 -0.056
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0299)
Religious polarization alpha=1.6 -0.208*** -0.214*** -0.207*** -0.150** -0.174
(0.0576) (0.0581) (0.0572) (0.0633)
Caste polarization alpha=16 0.211** 0.146* 0.199** -
(0.0844) (0.0857) (0.0909)
Caste polarization alpha=0 0.0113 0.0140 -
(0.0182) (0.0181)
Religious polarization alpha=0 -0.0567*** -
(0.0146)
ln state GDP 0.0113*** -
(0.00312)
Human development index as of 91 -0.121** -
(0.0483)
Observations 573 573 573 571 527
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Type of Water Access Effect on the Percentage of Crime
Percentage of Crime
(1) (2)
Water 0.00742*** 0.00874***
(0.000428) (1.49e-07)
ln district population -0.000920 -0.000695
(0.770) (0.791)
% district pop rural -0.0165 -0.0185
(0.289) (0.125)
% dist. pop SC 0.445*** 0.467***
(1.96e-05) (1.60e-08)
% dist. pop SC2 -0.858*** -0.896***
(0.00173) (2.65e-05)
% dist. pop ST -0.0735** -0.0331
(0.0209) (0.249)
% dist. pop ST2 0.144*** 0.0509
(0.000110) (0.233)
literacy rate -0.0610*** -0.0594***
(0.00458) (0.000456)
Religious polarization alpha=1.6 -0.194*** -0.152***
(0.000638) (0.000559)
Observations 573 530
Sample All states Tribal states removed
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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